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Labor Unions and Title VII: A Bit Player at 
the Creation Looks Back 
Theodore J. St. Antoine 
During the debates over what became Title VII (Equal Employment 
Opportunity) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 I was the junior partner 
of the then General Counsel of the AFL-CIO,]. Albert Woll. T here were 
only three of us in the firm. The 1niddle partner, Robert C. Mayer, han-
dled the business affairs of the Federation and our other union clients. 
Bob was also the son-in-law of George Meany, president of the AFL-
CIO, which gave us a unique access to Meany's thinking. The Federa-
tion had only one in-house lawyer, Associate General Counsel Thomas 
Everett Harris. Tom was an aristocratic Southerner and a brilliant lawyer 
who had clerked for Justice Harlan Fiske Stone on the U.S. Supreme 
Court. He and I were the labor law technicians, and we briefed and occa-
sionally argued the court and administrative cases in which the Federa-
tion became involved, usually in an amicus capacity. 
The often-fraught relationship of organized labor and the civil rights 
movement is a well-known story.2 Before Title VII, African Americans 
were openly excluded from membership in most railroad unions, and 
their numbers were sharply limited in the skilled construction trades, 
even though all those unions eventually had the legal obligation to pro-
vide "fair representation" of any minorities who did manage to get jobs 
252 A Nation of Widening Opportunities 
within the unions' jurisdiction.3 Given the mores and culture of that 
time, it was probably inevitable that many if not most rank-and-file 
union workers placed their perceived economic self-interest above any 
concerns about promoting racial equality. Yet the story is more compli-
cated than that of white workers simply taking advantage of discrimi-
nation against black workers, and the other side of the story needs to 
be remembered. Union leadership took a more principled position, and 
ultimately the official policy of the AFL-CIO was to support passage 
of the Civil Rights Act, including the prohibition of discrimination in 
employment by both employers and unions. 
The initial bill proposed by the Kennedy administration would have 
concentrated on voting rights, access to public accommodations, and 
public school desegregation.4 A fair employment practices (FEP) pro-
vision was considered too controversial and likely to doom the entire 
package. Two very different men, Walter Reuther and George Meany, 
played the key roles in shaping organized labor's response and helping 
to secure the addition of the Title VII that was finally adopted. Reuther, 
president of the United Automobile Workers and head of the AFL-CIO's 
Industrial Union Department (largely the former CIO unions before 
the merger), had long been a champion of black workers' civil rig.hts, 
including equal job rights, and was a member of the NAACP's board 
of directors. He was an eloquent speaker and a charismatic, sometimes 
imperious leader who on occasion could strain the patience even of his 
natural allies. On june 13, 1963, he and other labor leaders met with Pres-
ident Kennedy, and Reuther made an "impassioned plea" for the inclu-
sion of an FEP title in the administration's civil rights bill.5 About a week 
later, Reuther joined a group of top civil rights leaders to see the presi-
dent at the White House to reiterate the demand.6 Reuther also partic-
ipated in the March on Washington in August 1963, becoming the sole 
white union speaker when Martin Luther King delivered his famous "I 
Have a Dream" oration? 
In personality, AFL-CIO President George Meany and Walter Reuther 
were almost polar opposites. Reuther resonated to abstract principles 
and noble causes. Meany, who hailed from the Plumbers Union in New 
York City, was a cautious, crafty politician, struggling to hold together 
a highly divergent coalition of labor adherents. In contrast to Reuther's 
vaulting, evangelical speaking style, Meany's oral presentations were 
clear, methodical, down-to-earth. Yet Meany could also be moved by 
the plight of black workers. Although he would not have the AFL-CIO 
endorse the March on Washington, he set out on his own to convey 
the message to the White House that an FEP provision was essential, 
including coverage of labor unions. As reported through my partner, 
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Bob Mayer, President Kennedy responded: "George, I didn't think we 
needed one. I thought you could keep your troops in line." At this point 
Reuther might have delivered a sermon on the evils of racial discrimi-
nation. Meany's riposte was characteristically hard-nosed and lacking in 
self-righteousness: "Mr. President, that's exactly the problem. I can't keep 
the troops in line. I need a law I can blame!" More formally, Meany told 
the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee in july 1963: "We need 
the power of the federal government to do what we are not fully able to 
do [by ourselves]."8 
It can be argued whether the Meany or Reuther style was ultimately 
more effective. It is certainly true that at least for some significant listen-
ers, Reuther's moralistic hectoring could wear thin over time. When the 
March on Washington leaders met afterward with president Kennedy, 
Martin Luther King modestly sought to divert attention from his own 
great speech by asking the president whether he had heard Reuther's 
excellent address. Kennedy replied dryly, "Oh, I've heard him plenty of 
times."9 Numerous persons who found Reuther more congenial philo-
sophically wound up fonder of Meany personally. How might that affect 
persuasiveness? What is most important in the long run, however, is 
that these two men, Meany and Reuther, in their diverse ways, united 
in getting the labor movement officially to back the cause of an equal 
employment opportunity title. It is still debatable just how critical union 
support was. At least one reasonably disinterested observer, Professor 
Nelson Lichtenstein, then at the University of Virginia, declared flatly: 
"The trade union movement, both the AFL-CIO and the UAW, was 
primarily responsible for the addition of FEPC, now rechristened the 
Equal Etnployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), to the original 
Kennedy bill."10 But Herbert Hill, former labor secretary of the NAACP, 
has bitterly attacked this view, insisting that it exaggerated the position 
of organized labor as a progressive social force and overlooked massive 
union efforts to marginalize the effects of Title VII as finally enacted.11 
The AFL-CIO's leadership endorsernent of an FEP or EEO provision 
did not end the matter, however, in the eyes of much of the rank-and-
file. Senator Lister Hill of Alabama was an ardent segregationist but an 
economic populist. He somehow obtained the addresses of about sev-
enty thousand local unions affiliated with nationals belonging to the 
AFL-CIO. He wrote them, warning that passage of the civil rights bill 
would destroy one of their most prized possessions, seniority. Seniority 
reflects time with a particular employer or in a particular job or depart-
ment. It can determine priority in layoffs, recalls, promotions, and fringe 
benefits like vacations. In many locations, especially in the South, black 
workers were deprived of access to the better job lines and the seniority 
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attached to them. As a result of Hill's intervention, AFL-CIO headquar-
ters was inundated with outraged cries from local memberships, protest-
ing this threat to their precious seniority rights. I was assigned to draft 
the Federation's response. 
My thoughts were as follows, although the exact wording was the result 
of refinement by several hands: 
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is 
prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been 
discriminating in the past and as a result has an all -white working force, 
when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be simply 
to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be 
obliged-or indeed, permitted- to fire whites in order to hire Negroes or to 
prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired to give them 
special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier. 
That language was later adopted, after extensive negotiations by AFL-
CIO representatives and the legislation's sponsors, by Senators Joseph 
S. Clark (Democrat of Pennsylvania) and C1ifford P. Case (Republican of 
New Jersey), in an "Interpretive Memorandum" on Title VII, for which 
they were the "bipartisan captains" in the Senate.12 The Justice Depart-
ment submitted a rebuttal to the arguments of Senator Lister Hill to the 
same effect.13 
Once the 1964 Civil Rights Act was safely passed and Title VII became 
law, civil rights groups understandably downplayed this particular leg-
islative history and insisted that the "current perpetuation" of past dis-
crimination in seniority constituted a present violation of the statute. 
As one African American lawyer friend put it to me: "Ted, I was not 
part of whatever compromise may have been struck in getting Title VII 
enacted, and as a good advocate I am going to push the statutory lan-
guage as far as l think it should go." As it turned out, that was quite a way. 
Until the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the issue, six courts of appeals 
in more than thirty cases held that seniority systems that perpetuated 
the effects of pre-Act discrimination did violate Title VII.14 Two other 
courts of appeals were in accord in dicta.15 In International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v. United States, 16 however, a 7-2 Supreme Court majority ruled 
that § 703(h) of Title VII (and the legislative history previously cited) 
immunized bona fide seniority systems from liability under the CRA. 
Naturally, I believe the majority got it right. Section 703(h) provides in 
pertinent part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards 
of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which 
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measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees 
who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not the 
result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or 
. al . . 17 natiOn ongm ... 
Civil rights proponents protested, not unreasonably, that the inevitable 
tendency of the seniority cases was to lock a whole generation of African 
American workers into the less desirable jobs to which pre-Title VII 
discrimination had confined them. Even if they somehow managed to 
move into the higher-level jobs that were now theoretically available to 
them, they would wind up at the very bottom of the seniority ladder for 
those positions or departments. They would thus risk being the first laid 
off and the last recalled in the event of any economic downturn, as well 
as losing other benefit priorities. Those were indeed the regrettable facts. 
But labor leaders wishing to support Title VII also faced some harsh 
realities. The rank-and-file were up in arms over what they perceived 
(correctly, as it first developed) to be a serious threat to their valuable 
seniority. Union officials must face elections, and the 1960s were a time 
of flux, when numerous incumbents were voted out of office. The 
Kennedy administration was initially opposed to an FEP or EEO title, 
with the Justice Department calling labor-liberal efforts to add one "a 
disaster.1118 Under all those circumstances, it seems entirely sensible for 
Title VII supporters among the labor leadership to feel they had to mol-
lify their memberships by preserving seniority rights as they did. In 
effect, postponing for a generation the full promise of Title VII's nondis-
crimination strictures may well have been the price that had to be paid 
to get an EEO title. By its very nature, of course, a bona fide seniority 
plan can hold back only about one generation when it is set in the con-
text of a law prohibiting discrimination in hiring, promotions, and other 
terms and conditions of employment. 
Retired federal District Judge Nancy Gertner has asserted: "Federal 
judges from the trial court to the Supreme Court have interpreted the 
[Civil Rights] Act virtually, although not entirely, out of existence."19 
Judge Gertner places much emphasis on the actual experience of dis-
crimination plaintiffs compared to other plaintiffs in the litigation 
process, from summary judgment through trial through appeal. In what 
is surely the single most important judicial gloss on Title VII, however, 
the Supreme Court came out most favorably for alleged victims of dis-
crimination. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co}° Chief Justice Burger spoke 
for a unanimous Court in holding that the statute was violated not only 
by intentional discrimination but also by the use of any job qualifica-
tion-such as a high school education or passing a general intelligence 
test-that disproportionately disqualifies a particular protected group 
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and is not shown to be significantly related to successful job perfor-
mance. 
Griggs thus introduced the now famous "disparate impact" theory of 
discrimination, as distinguished from the more conventional "disparate 
treatment" or intentional theory. Subsequently, the Court acknowl-
edged: "Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil 
Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII."21 The Court went on 
to state that disparate impact claims "involve employment practices that 
are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups, but that in fact 
fall more harshly on one group than another, and cannot be justified 
by business necessity .... Proof of discriminatory motive .. .is not required 
under a disparate-impact theory."22 
For someone like me, who was concededly only a bit player in this 
great undertaking but who nonetheless had a ringside seal at it, it is sig-
nificant that I cannot ever recall during the endless discussions of Title 
VII any explicit reference to something like the "disparate impact" the-
ory. Moreover, despite the Griggs Court's tussle with the legislative his-
tory, I find nothing there that clearly and positively supports disparate 
impact.23 Chief Justice Burger invoked a striking image when he said: 
"Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for employment or 
promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in the sense 
of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox."24 But the artistry 
cannot conceal the conclusory, unproven nature of the proposition. Sec-
tion 703(h), the one provision expressly dealing with testing, states in 
pertinent part: 
[N]or shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give 
and to act upon Lhe results of any professionally developed ability test pro-
vided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not 
designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, 
sex or national origin.25 
Chief Justice Burger found comfort in the word "used" in the sentence 
dealing with ability tests; it does not appear in the part of the same sec-
tion dealing with seniority and merit systems. That can be scored as a 
good debater's point. But in the absence of any further explanation of 
its significance in the legislative history, one has to wonder about how 
much weight to attach to that single generalized word. Would Congress 
have been that indirect or circumspect in promulgating a whole new 
theory of discrimination? 
How necessary was the disparate impact theory, anyway? Section 
8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act prohibits "discrimination ... to 
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."26 In 
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NLRB v. Brown, the Supreme Court concluded that "Congress clearly 
intended the employer's purpose in discriminating to be controlling."27 
But then the Court immediately added: 
[W]hen an employer practice is inherently destructive of employee rights 
and is not justified by the service of important business ends, no specific evi-
dence of intent to discourage union membership is necessary to establish a 
violation of§ 8(a)(3). This principle, we have said, is "but an application of the 
common-law rule that a man is held to intend the foreseeable consequences 
of his conduct."28 
As I see it, most if not all of what the Court accomplished in Griggs 
through enunciating the new disparate impact theory under Title VII 
could have been achieved less controversially by an application of the 
commonsense principle that persons may be held to have intended the 
natural consequences of their actions.29 Does anyone have any seri-
ous doubts about what Duke Power was up to when it instituted new 
job qualifications on the very day Title VII went into effect? At most, 
disparate treatment analysis would seem to permit a challenged party 
one free pass on a claim of business necessity as a defense. Once that 
defense was overcome and the consequences known, any continuation of 
the practice could appropriately be regarded as an intentional violation. 
One can safely say that even the present conservative Supreme Court 
would be reluctant to back away from the unanimous decision in Griggs. 
Moreover, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress confirmed the exis-
tence of disparate-impact violations by spelling out their manner of 
proof in a new§ 703(k).30 Nonetheless, in a concurring opinion in Ricci v. 
DeStefano, Justice Scalia warned that the Court's disposition of that case 
"merely postpones the evil day on which the Court will have to confront 
the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact pro-
visions of Title Vll ... consistent with the Constitution's guarantee of equal 
protection?"31 Justice Scalia elaborated his position: 
[T]itle VII's disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, 
often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, 
and to make decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes. That 
type of racial decisionmaking is, as the Court explains, discriminatory.32 
Professor Richard Primus suggests a means of defending d isparate 
impact analysis. 33 He starts by spelling out what he calls the Ricci 
premise: the City of New Haven's suspension of a written job test 
because of its disproportionately adverse effect on African American 
firefighters "would constitute disparate treatment under Title VII unless 
suspending the test were justified by Title VII's provisions regarding 
disparate impact."34 Primus concedes that if the emphasis is placed on 
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the race conscious action of a public employer (subject to constitutional 
limitations) in implementing a disparate impact remedy, which is how 
Justice Scalia sees it, disparate impact doctrine is likely to be in "fatal" 
conflict with equal protection's requirement of racial neutrality.35 
Primus insists, however, that there are two other ways of viewing the 
situation. First, there is an institutional difference between the roles of 
public employers and courts.36 Courts are authorized to remedy racial 
discrimination and they cannot assess any kind of discrimination claim 
without knowing the race of the parties. Public employers are pre-
cluded from such race-conscious decision making. Second, the atten-
tion may focus on the visible victims.37 In Ricci, Primus points out, New 
Haven's decision "disadvantaged determinate and visible innocent third 
parties-that is, the white firefighters," while "[m]ost disparate impact 
remedies avoid creating such victims."38 Primus concludes that the con-
stitutionality of disparate impact doctrine may turn on the particular 
lens through which the Court subsequently views such equal protection 
claims-and the skill of advocates in bringing the right case before the 
Court.39 My own conclusion is that the Griggs Court could have avoided 
these problems by a more generous and realistic reading of Congress's 
actual design-to prohibit intentional discrimination in all its manifes-
tations. 
The problem of disparate impact pales by comparison with the prob-
lem of "affirmative action"-conceptually, ethically, and sociologically. 
Affirmative action-racial or other preferences among human 
groups-to achieve some seemingly desirable or compelling public 
interest is well covered by other contributors to this volume.40 I will 
therefore limit myself to a few brief personal observations. The first and 
most obvious is that the primary, abiding theme of both the text and the 
legislative history of Title VII is color-blindness (or equivalent blindness 
regarding gender and other protected categories). The Clark-Case Mem-
orandum filed by the senators who were in effect floor managers for the 
EEO provision is replete with such references. It is a model of the "plain 
meaning" approach to language: 
It has been suggested that the concept of discrimination is vague. In fact it 
is clear and simple and has no hidden meanings. To discriminate is to make 
a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor, and those distinc-
tions or differences in treatment or favor which are prohibited by section 
704 [now 703] are those which are based on any five of forbidden criteria: 
race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.41 
Congress, like the rest of us promoting equal employment opportunity, 
was very naive-or else we all affected naivete. It was as if the magic 
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wand of one federal statute could erase three hundred years of bondage, 
degradation, and exclusion. At least by hindsight, we know it did not 
work. 
Justice Brennan showed more sophistication when he wrote for the 
Court in the Weber case: 
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over 
centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who 
had ''been excluded from the American dream for so long," constituted the 
first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to 
abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.42 
In Weber, a 5-2 Court upheld the legality of a union-employer affirma-
tive action plan that reserved 50 percent of the openings in a plant's 
craft training program until the percentage of black craft workers in the 
plant was commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the local labor 
force.43 Yet however much one might wish to applaud the result in Weber 
on the basis of policy, it contained a very serious analytical flaw. Justice 
Brennan never came to grips with the meaning of the critical word, "dis-
criminate." 
The Clark-Case Memorandum equated "discriminate" with "distin-
guish" on certain specified grounds. That reading, if straightforwardly 
applied, would have been fatal to the Weber approach. But lhere is 
another way to interpret "discriminate." One of the great federal judges, 
Henry Friendly, had this to say: "Although '[i]n common parlance, the 
word (to discriminate) means to distinguish or differentiate,' .. .it more 
often means, both in common and particularly in legal parlance, to 
distinguish or differentiate without sufficient reason."44 That could have 
opened the door to a more capacious interpretation than a strictly literal 
reading. Once Justice Brennan had accomplished that, his reliance on 
the spirit rather than the letter of the law, and his use of somewhat 
strained but favorable portions oflegislative history, would have seemed 
more acceptable. 
Another aspect of Weber has always seemed anomalous to me as some-
one who is not a constitutional specialist. Justice Brennan emphasized it 
right at the outset of his analysis: "Since the Kaiser-USWA plan does not 
involve state action, this case does not present an alleged violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."45 The implica-
tion is that equal protection would have been a more stringent standard 
for a valid affirmative action plan. 1ndeed, subsequent decisions invali-
dating the plans of governmental bodies appear to bear that out.46 Yet 
it is Title VII that defines the prohibited conduct so explicitly as "to dis-
criminate ... because of...race."47 Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment 
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does not even mention race and speaks very broadly: u[N]or shall any 
State ... deny to any person wilhin its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws."48 If one emphasizes the text, "equal protection" is surely 
the more flexible test. And a philosopher whose mind was uncluttered 
by vacillating judicial pronouncements might well conclude that a state 
is not denying equal protection when it treats differently-and pref-
erentially-groups of persons who are in fact differently-and 
unequally-situated.49 Those unequal situations could be the result of 
hurricanes, earthquakes, plagues, or physical or mental disabilities. Why 
not generations of racial discrimination? 
I hardly expect a return to such a pristine concept at this relatively 
advanced stage in the development of equal protection theory. But the 
more we recognize that the equal treatment of unequals may not be the 
best way to ensure the "equal protection of the laws," the more we may 
be ready to extend such established doctrines as "compelling state inter-
est" as a qualification on the prohibition of racial distinctions. 
A half-century ago, many of us, those in the civil rights movement 
and union supporters alike, shared Martin Luther King's "dream." The 
"dream" was a dream of genuine integration-the existence of all races 
in our society on a plane of equality. We felt Title VII was our vehicle. Yet 
fifty years after the passage of Title VII, the median household income 
of blacks is $33,321 while that of whites is $57,009, or 71 percent more.50 
The unemployment rate of blacks is 12.5 percent, or double that of 
whites at 6.2 percent. 51 We may have come a long way in certain respects 
since 1964. But to fulfill that dream, we still have a very long way to go. 
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